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STRAW MEN IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS
ROBERT N. COOKt
The principles by which human conduct is judged may be
classified as legal, equitable, and moral. Without determining
whether all legal and equitable principles are also moral, it can
be said that there are certain moral principles which will not be
enforced by a court of law or equity. Yet, certain of these moral
obligations make acts legal which would otherwise be illegal.
Much of the following discussion will relate to these principles
as applied to transfers of land to one commonly called a straw
man,1 "dummy", 2 or trustee of a passive or "dry" trust.
The modern straw man, "dummy", or trustee of a passive
trust is simply the modern feoffee to uses. Legal historians tell
us that the first uses in England were those created by the Fran-
ciscan friars in the thirteenth century to evade the rules of their
order which prohibited them from owning property.3 If some
one desired to convey land to a member of this religious organi-
t A.B., Bucknell University, 1933; LL.B., Duke University, 1936. Visit-
ing Assistant Professor of Law, University of Louisville.1. "* * * mere conduit or medium for convenience in holding and passing
title." Van Raalte v. Epstein (1906) 202 Mo. 173, 99 S. W. 1077, 1079.
"In this condition of the record the case does not call for judicial com-
ment on the business morality of the secret and deceptive use of a 'man of
straw' in real estate contracts-a questionable practice, the product of in-
sincerity and mere commercialism. By the term 'man of straw' we under-
stand one of no substance, one in name only, an irresponsible person having
no property to respond in damages, who loans himself out to others to sign
contracts as a purchaser knowing be is acting a lie-an office no honorable
man should fill, and no honorable man should ask another to fill." Houtz v.
Hellman (1910) 228 Mo. 655, 128 S. W. 1001, 1005.
2. "* * * a person who holds the legal title to real property under a moral
obligation to recognize another as the owner." Hegstad v. Wysiecki (1917)
178 App. Div. 733, 165 N. Y. S. 898, 900.
'in land office practice dummies are either fictitious persons, or those
who, having no interest in the transaction, permit the use of their names
for the perpetration of a fraud and sign papers and make affidavits per-
functorily." United States v. Munday (C. C. W. D. Wash. 1911) 186 Fed.
375, 385.
3. Maitland, Equity (1936) 25; 4 Holdsworth, History of English Law
(1937) 416. It is believed that the use was derived from the German
treuhand or salman, and not from the fidei-commissum of the civil law.
1 Bogert, Trust and Trustees (1935) 9-10, see. 2.
For a recent conveyance by a member of the clergy to avoid the rule
against owning property see Hegstad v. Wysiecki (1917) 178 App. Div.
733, 165 N. Y. S. 898.
The authorities on the origin of uses and trusts are collected in Bogert,
Cases on Trusts (1939) 1.
Washington University Open Scholarship
STRAW MEN IN REALTY TRANSACTIONS
zation, he simply enfeoffed a layman to the use of the member.
The same procedure would be employed when the conveyance
was to the use of the society itself. No law or equity court would
enforce the feoffee to use's promise that he would permit the
cestui que use (an individual member of the society itself) to
receive the rents and profits. He was only morally obligated to
do so, and this moral obligation was enforced by threatening
him with spiritual punishment. Later this same type of convey-
ance was utilized to evade the Mortmain Statutes which pro-
hibited religious corporations or organizations from holding title
to land.4 Although this practice was quickly stopped by subse-
quent Act of Parliament,5 the people had learned that feoffment
to uses made the interest of the cestui que use devisable, freely
alienable, and free from forfeiture and the incidents of feudal
tenure.6 . From about the beginning of the fifteenth century the
Chancellor, an ecclesiastic, recognized the interest of the benefi-
ciary, thereby converting the obligations of the feoffee to uses
from a purely moral duty to an equitable one.7 Naturally the
increased alienability; the power to create freehold estates to
begin in the future; the devisability; the freedom from for-
feiture, feudal burdens, and sale by the creditors of the cestui
que use, made uses quite popular in England. Because the reve-
nue of the Crown depended on forfeitures and feudal dues, and
because creditors could not enforce their claims against the land
of their debtors, the Statute of Uses8 was passed in 1535 to
abolish the passive use by putting legal title in the cestui que
use. It has been said:
The statute met with the most determined opposition from
the bench and bar. Notwithstanding the many alleged
frauds which could be committed by an abuse of the doctrine,
public sentiment was opposed to its absolute destruction, and
was in favor of preserving the power of creating an equi-
table estate in the nature of a use, and, notwithstanding
4. 2 Blackstone, Commentaries, *271-272.
5. (1391) 15 Rich. 11, c. 5.
6. 2 Blackstone, Commentaries, *329; 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees
(1935) 11, sec. 2; 1 Scott, Trusts (1939) 12, sec. 1.3. For American con-
veyance to straw man to avoid possible forfeiture, see Susong v. Williams
(1870) 48 Tenn. 625.
7. 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) 13, sec. 3; 1 Scott, Trusts
(1939) 13, sec. 1.4.
8. (1535) 27 Henry VIII, c. 10. Repealed (1922) 12 & 13 Geo. V, c. 16,
see. 1 (7).
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the remedial character of the statute, it received at the
hands of the profession a strict and technical construction
and was permitted to operate only so far as it was impossible
to render nugatory its express provisions. Instead of de-
stroying uses the statute only established them upon a firmer
basis.9
The decisions of the equity courts after the Statute of Uses
reveal the desire of the bar and of the judiciary to keep the
interest of the beneficiary equitable and free from the burdens of
legal principles. About the middle of the seventeenth century the
courts of equity recognized the second use in a conveyance to
the use of B to the use of C, "and by this means a statute made
upon great consideration, introduced in a solemn and pompous
manner, by this strict construction, has had no other effect than
to add at most, three words to a conveyance." 10
Many years have passed since the Statute of Uses was adopted
to abolish the passive trust or use, but some of the same prob-
lems, in addition to others, remain unsolved. The cases on the
various problems are so numerous that space would not permit
citing decisions and statutes from all the states nor considering
all the problems. Therefore, discussion will be restricted to cer-
tain problems and to selected cases, representing the different
views.
The modern feoffee to uses or straw man may be a natural
person, partnership, corporation, or other legal entity." While
he may be used to hold title to any type of property, consideration
will be given only to certain problems arising from conveyances
of land to a straw man. These land transactions may be divided
into Passive Trusts for the Settlor's Benefit; Purchase Money
Trusts; and, Straw Men as Conduits of Title.
PASSIVE TRUSTS FOR THE SETTLOR'S BENEFIT
Almost every state, if not all, recognizes the English Statute
of Uses as part of its common law, has enacted a similar statute,
or has adopted by decision the policy of recognizing the benefi-
9. 2 Blackstone, Commentaries (Lewis ed. 1902) 791, n. 150.
10. Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, Hopkins v. Hopkins (1738) 1 Atk. 581,
591, 26 Eng. Rep. 365, 372. The law courts had earlier refused to recognize
the second use. Tyrrel's Case (1557) 2 Dyer 155a, 73 Eng. Rep. 336.
"The Statute of Uses does not execute a use or trust created upon a use
or trust." Restatement, Trusts (1935) sec. 71. 1 Scott, Trusts (1939) 421,
sec. 71.
11. Conveyances to fictitious persons vill not be considered.
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ciary of a passive trust to be the holder of the legal title. 2 In
a passive trust the trustee has no active duties to perform. The
beneficiary of such a trust manages the property though the
trustee may sign leases, mortgages, and other papers, and may
pay taxes, assessments, et cetera with money furnished by the
beneficiary. The fact that the trustee is under a duty to convey
as directed by the beneficiary would not make the trust an
active one.13
Prior to the Statute of Uses it was presumed that a voluntary
conveyance created a passive trust for the benefit of the feoffor
or grantor. This presumption could be rebutted by the feoffee's
proving that he had paid valuable consideration or that a use
had been declared for the feoffee or another person. Because
passive trusts are not supposed to be common today, a voluntary
conveyance for no consideration would likely be presumed to be
a gift.'4 Only when there is a written or an oral agreement that
the grantee will permit the grantor to manage the property and
will convey on demand do we have the problems of a passive
trust.
A. Settlar v. Straw Man
Whether the settlor can enforce a trust against his straw man
to whom title was conveyed subject to the order of the settlor
depends upon the character of the transaction. If the convey-
ance was for the purpose of defrauding creditors and it is neces-
sary to bring a bill in equity to enforce an oral or written agree-
ment by the straw man to reconvey, the equity courts are
unanimous in refusing to grant relief because the plaintiff does
not come into court with clean hands.15 This means of punishing
fraudulent grantors will likely not deter others from relying on
the moral integrity of a particular grantee in order to defraud
12. 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) 603, sec. 208.
13. 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) 588, sec. 206; 1 Scott, Trusts
(1939) 415, see. 69; Restatement, Trusts (1935) sec. 69.
14. 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) 1354, sec. 453; 3 Scott, Trusts
(1939) 2169, sec. 405; Restatement, Trusts (1935) sec. 405.
15. Jones v. Jefferson (1933) 334 Mo. 606, 66 S. W. (2d) 555. Cases are
collected in Note (1934) 89 A. L. R. 1166, 1168; 1 Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees (1935) 617, n. 19. Cf. Note (1938) 117 A. L. R. 1464, on action
against third party in whose name title was taken to defraud plaintiff's
creditors.
But if grantee, being in a position to influence the grantor, induced the
grantor to make the conveyance, equity will order a reconveyance. Ander-
son v. Nelson (1927) 83 Cal. App. 1, 256 Pac. 294; Restatement, Trusts
(1935) sec. 422, comment d.
19401
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his creditors. When it is certain that creditors will take the
debtor's land, the possibility that a grantee may refuse to re-
convey on demand would hardly be a deterrent.1 6 Consequently,
several states17 have made it a crime to knowingly receive title
to property to aid the grantor to defraud his creditors. These
statutes should give the grantee the needed "excuse" to refuse
to accept title to land from his insolvent friend.
If the agreement to reconvey is in writing and if the grantee
of a fraudulent conveyance has no active duties or manages the
property as the grantor's agent, then the grantor would have
the legal title under the Statute of Uses.' 8 However, the deed
to the grantee would probably be recorded, making the grantor's
title defeasible by a conveyance from the grantee to a bona fide
purchaser for value, and therefore not marketable.
If at the time of the conveyance to the straw man the grantor
had him reconvey title but recorded only the deed to the straw
man, the legal title in the grantor would be concealed and his
creditors might be defrauded. As soon as the grantor believed
it safe to reveal his ownership, he could record the deed of re-
conveyance without any aid from the straw man. Thus the
grantor could protect himself against the possibility that the
straw man might later refuse to reconvey on demand where there
was only a deed to the straw man and a secret oral or written
agreement to reconvey. Therefore, the refusal of a court of
equity to enforce an oral or written agreement to reconvey on
demand land transferred to defraud the grantor's creditors
really punishes the grantor for his ignorance and not for fraud,
without aiding his defrauded creditors.
The Massachusetts court has adopted the seemingly inequi-
16. But cf. "While it may strain the sympathies of the courts fre-
quently, it would appear that from the point of view of expediency and
policy it would be best to refuse relief under such conditions. Such a de-
cision will bring about the object probably foremost in the mind of the
court, namely, the effective discouragement of trusts with fraudulent or
illegal objects." 1 Bogert Trusts and Trustees (1935) 618, sec. 211.
17. Ark. Dig. of Stats. (Pope's 1937) secs. 3077, 3079; Colo. Stats.(1935) c. 48, sees. 303, 305; Iowa Code (1935) sec. 13,051; Me. Rev. Stats.
(1930) c. 138, sec. 4.
The possibility of an action against the straw man for conspiracy does
not seem to be a deterrent because judgment will probably be for the de-
fendant or he will be judgment proof. Orrick v. Heberer (Mo. App. 1939)
124 S. W. (2d) 664. Cases on actions for conspiracy against straw men are
collected in Note (1919) 2 A. L. R. 287.
18. Bing v. People (1930) 254 N. Y. 484, 173 N. E. 687.
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table position of granting relief to a fraudulent grantor if he can
prove the necessary facts without showing fraud.19 Here again
the court punishes for ignorance and not for fraud. Would it
not be better for the court of equity to require that notice with
request to intervene be sent to creditors of both grantor and
grantee so that all interested parties would be brought before
the court ?20 The property could then be sold at judicial sale, the
defrauded creditors paid, and any balance given to the grantor
if creditors of the grantee had not relied or obtained an interest
superior to the grantor's under the particular recording act. The
court would not be a party to any fraud, the creditors would be
paid, and the repentant grantor rewarded. The fraudulent
grantor would not be rewarded to induce repentance for its ethi-
cal benefits, but to aid defrauded creditors to secure payment of
their just claims.
There are many conveyances to a straw man that are not
fraudulent. The owner of land may desire to borrow money
using land as security. Not desiring to become personally liable
for the payment of any deficiency, he conveys to some one who
is not financially responsible. This person then executes the
necessary note or bond and the mortgage. This land may or
may not be immediately reconveyed to the grantor. This means
of avoiding personal liability has been held not to be fraudulent
so long as the mortgagee is not induced to believe that the real
owner is personally liable on the note.
2 1
Although the real owner of land could execute a note and
19. Gerace v. Gerace (Mass. 1938) 16 N. E. (2d) 6, 117 A. L. R. 1458;
O'Gasapian v. Danielson (1933) 284 Mass. 27, 187 N. E. 107, 89 A. L. R.
1159; cf. Monahan v. Monahan (1904) 77 Vt. 133, 59 Ati. 169, 70 L. R. A.
935.
20. Joinder of Parties.
"Compulsory joinder. All persons whose interests are so interrelated
that they must be before the court in order that it may give adequate
relief in the action, and who would be unduly prejudiced by a judgment
rendered in their absence are indispensable, and must be joined. Persons
who are not indispensable, but who ought to be parties if complete relief
is to be accorded are conditionally necessary, and must be joined where the
requirements of federal jurisdiction, jurisdiction over their persons, and
venue permit.
"Permissive joinder. Plaintiffs or defendants may join or be joined
when there is a question of law or fact common to their claims." 2 Moore's
Federal Practice (1938) 2188, sec. 21.01.
21. State ex rel. Mesker v. Reynolds (Mo. 1922) 245 S. W. 1065, 25
A. L. R. 1484; Underwood v. Patrick (C. C. A. 8, 1899) 94 Fed. 468, cert.
den. (1899) 175 U. S. 726.
1940]
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mortgage in such form that he would not be personally liable,
the note and mortgage would hardly be marketable because non-
negotiable. 22 Also, a purchaser of such a note would probably
feel that he might lose if the land proved to be of less value than
the note, whereas a note signed by a financially irresponsible
person would create the mental feeling that if the land should
prove insufficient the deficiency could be collected from the maker,
since the holder of the note would not know of the maker's in-
solvency. Should this type of deception be sanctioned when we
are trying to protect buyers of stocks, bonds, et cetera, against
hidden defects ?23
Following a legitimate conveyance to a straw man, he may
refuse to reconvey on demand. If the agreement to convey as
directed was oral, then the court must either enforce the Statute
of Frauds or create an exception to the statute. It is clear that
relief need not be granted.
Most states require a trust of land to be in writing and to be
properly signed. 24 In these states, by decision or statute, con-
structive and resulting trusts need not be in writing because
they are created by law. 25 Therefore, the question which arises
in an action to enforce an oral trust is whether the court should
impose a resulting trust upon the grantee for the benefit of the
grantor. The Uniform Trusts Act,26 and a number of courts,
state that a resulting trust for the settlor's benefit arises when-
ever an oral trust is not enforceable because of the Statute of
22. Negotiable Instruments Law sec. 1 (2), 3; cf. Lorimer v. McGreevy(1935) 299 Mo. App. 970, 84 S. W. (2d) 667; Comment (1936) 49 Harv.
L. Rev. 478.
23. See MacChesney and O'Brien, Full Disclosure Under the Securities
Act (1937) 4 Law & Contemp. Prob. 133.
24. Statutes are collected in 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) 251,
n. 10.
25. 1 Bogert, Trust and Trustees (1935) 271, see. 67.
26. "See. 16 (Unenforceable Oral Trust Created by Deed.)
"1. When an interest in real property is conveyed by deed to a person
on a trust which is unenforceable on account of the Statute of Frauds * * *
the intended trustee * * * shall be under a duty to convey the interest in
real property to the settlor or his successor in interest. A court havingjurisdiction may prescribe the conditions upon which the interest shall be
conveyed to the settlor or his successor in interest.
"2. Where the intended trustee has transferred part or all of his interest
and it has come into the hands of a bonafide purchaser, the intended trustee
shall be liable to the settlor or his successor in interest for the value of the
interest thus transferred at the time of its transfer, less such offsets as the
court may deem equitable."
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Frauds. The English decisions 27 and a few of the American state
courts28 have held that upon the grantee's refusing to reconvey
on demand a resulting trust for the benefit of the grantor arises.
This trust is based on the fact that the original conveyance
resulted from the oral promise to hold to the use of the grantor.
Other American courts have enforced the oral trust whenever
the grantee has permitted the grantor to enter into or to remain
in possession and to make valuable improvements, on the theory
that part performance takes the oral trust out of the Statute of
Frauds.2 9 There is decided conflict in the cases as to whether
entering into or remaining in possession is in itself sufficient.30
27. Davies v. Otty (1865) 35 Beav. 208, 55 Eng. Rep. 875; In re Duke
of Marlborough [1894] 2 Ch. 133.
28. "It is a familiar principle in equity that a trust is implied whenever
the circumstances are such that the person taking the legal estate, whether
by fraud or otherwise, cannot enjoy the beneficial interest without violating
the rules of honesty and fair dealing. It is true that some hold that a
fraud must exist at the time the title is acquired-an element lacking here,
as we have seen; some say that this fraudulent intent will be inferred from
a subsequent failure to perform the agreement under which the title is
obtained; while still others take the ground that fraud at the outset is
established by proof of subsequent fraud. It is enough here to say that
the best considered modern cases go to the extent of holding that when one
conveys the title to his property to another in reliance upon the latter's
promise, a conscientious obligation is imposed, a violation of which for the
grantee's own advantage is such a fraud that equity will make him a con-
structive trustee for the benefit of the grantor or his beneficiary. And this
will be so, though the grantee enters into the agreement with an honest
intention of performing it." Miller v. Belville (1924) 98 Vt. 243, 126 Atl.
590, 592. Other cases which seem to support the English rule are collected
in 1 Scott, Trusts (1939) 249, n. 5; 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935)
1588, n. 22. Most of these cases can be distinguished as being purchase-
money trusts, actual fraud at date of conveyance, confidential relationship,
or purchase at judicial sale under oral trust to convey to original owner.
In Massachusetts the grantor can recover in an action at law the value
of the property though he can not compel a reconveyance by a bill in equity.
Cromwell v. Norton (1906) 193 Mass. 291, 79 N. E. 433.
The following writers have advocated the enforcement by courts of equity
of oral promises to reconvey. Ames, Constructive Trusts Based upon the
Breach of an Express Oral Trust of Land (1907) 20 Harv. L. Rev. 549,
555; Costigan, Trusts Based on Oral Promises to Hold In Trust, To Convey,
or To Devise, Made by Voluntary Grantees (1914) 12 Mich. L. Rev. 515;
Stone, Resulting Trusts and The Statute of Frauds (1906) 6 Col. L. Rev.
326.
29. Goff v. Goff (1916) 98 Kan. 201, 158 Pac. 26; Thierry v. Thierry
(1923) 298 Mo. 25, 249 S. W. 946. Cases are collected in 1 Scott, Trusts
(1939) 277, n. 2.
30. Gallagher v. Northrup (1905) 215 Ill. 563, 74 N. E. 711 (possession
by grantor removed oral trust from Statute of Frauds). Contra: Bolin v.
Krengel (1924) 116 Kan. 459, 227 Pac. 266.
The Connecticut court has held that delivery of the deed to the voluntary
grantee constitutes part performance so as to make an oral trust to re-
convey enforceable against the grantee. Crocker v. Higgins (1829) 7 Conn.
19401
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Of course, if there is a fiduciary relationship between grantor
and grantee and the conveyance was due to this relationship,
or to fraud, duress, or mistake, all courts would impose a con-
structive trust for the grantor's benefit.$'
Those courts which have refused to enforce the grantee's oral
agreement to reconvey look only to the immediate parties to the
action and to the language of the statute. There are few legal
problems that can be solved by ignoring the interests of. third
parties and without a full consideration of the history of the
particular problem. Therefore, if the courts would consider
the question of the enforceability of an oral agreement to recon-
vey in relation to other problems, they might be induced to over-
rule their prior decisions.
Prior to the Statute of Uses a voluntary conveyance without
any declaration of a use created a resulting use for the grantor.
So far as is known there are no cases where such a grantee has
been defrauded by the grantor. Therefore, the Statute of Frauds
was probably passed to prevent fraud by persons other than
the original owners who claimed title under oral agreements.
Realizing this fact, the English courts excepted from the Statute
of Frauds the oral agreement to reconvey by calling it a resulting
trust. Due to the fact that the first Statute of Frauds was passed
by Parliament, the decisions of the English courts likely repre-
sent a more complete understanding of the purpose of this
statute than the American decisions construing state statutes
copied from the English Statute of Frauds.
In addition to preventing unjust enrichment, the recognition
342; Hayden v. Denslow (1858) 27 Conn. 335. Contra: Feeney v. Howard
(1889) 79 Cal. 525, 21 Pac. 984.
31. Cases are collected in 3 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) 1594,
sec. 496; 1 Scott, Trusts (1939) 237, 238, secs. 44.1, 44.2.
Section 44 of the Restatement of Trusts (1935) and section 182 of the
Restatement of Restitution (1936) provide that the grantee of a voluntary
conveyance who orally agreed to reconvey to the grantor holds the land as
constructive trustee in the following cases: first, if the transfer was pro-
cured by fraud, duress, undue influence, or mistake; second, if there was a
confidential relationship between the grantor and the grantee; third, if
the transfer was made as security for .an indebtedness of the transferor.
The Caveat to section 182 of the Restatement of Restitution states:
"The Institute takes no position on the question whether the transferee
holds upon a constructive trust for the transferor an interest in land trans-
ferred to him inter vivos, where he orally agreed with the transferor to
hold it in trust for the transferor or to reconvey it to the transferor, except
under the circumstances stated in this Section."
A similar Caveat follows section 44 of the Restatement of Trusts.
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of an equitable interest in the grantor would aid the courts to
prevent fraudulent conveyances.3 2 Because fraud depends upon
factors not necessarily presented to the court in an action by
the grantor to compel a reconveyance and because this is a type
of transaction which is commonly used to defraud creditors, the
judges should be astute enough to devise means of discovering
this type of illegal transfer. No one is better informed as to
the nature of the transfer than the grantor. Therefore, he should
be encouraged to bring before a court of equity all the facts per-
taining to such a transfer. Obviously, he will not be encouraged
to present the facts to the court if he will never be granted any
relief. Therefore, the courts of equity should award to the
grantor the land or the balance of the proceeds remaining after
satisfying the claims of all the grantor's creditors and of the
grantee's creditors entitled to protection because of their reli-
ance or because of the particular recording act. This can be done
only by notifying the creditors of both the grantor and the
grantee and by requesting them to intervene to protect their
interest.s If all creditors of the grantor and grantee consent
to the reconveyance, then it should be ordered. The grantee can
always protect himself by proving the payment of valuable con-
sideration. This type of procedure should be followed in all
actions to enforce a written or oral promise to reconvey land.
The extra time required by the court would likely prevent sub-
sequent expensive actions by the grantor's or grantee's credi-
tors to reach the property.
If a court of equity refuses to enforce an oral agreement to
reconvey, does the grantor have any interest which his creditors
can reach if the original conveyance was not fraudulent? The
reputed wealth of an individual may be, and likely is, based upon
the amount of real or personal property that he "owns", whether
32. "Perhaps it is too late in the day to expect, says Bower, however
desirable it may be, that the appellate tribunals of the land may in some
case yet to be decided immortalize themselves by boldly discarding the word
fraud, and proclaiming its futility. Its meaning includes so many different
hues and forms that the courts must confine themselves to comparatively
few general rules for its discovery and defeat. It is generally understood
that the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case, in connection with
their legal remedies, are permitted to bear heavily on the judgment of the
court or jury in determining whether this ambiguous thing, called fraud,
is present or absent." McCleary, Damage as Requisite to Rescission for
Misrepresentation (1937) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 2.
33. See note 20, supra.
1940]
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it is held in his own or another's name. Therefore, when credit
is extended on the basis of reputed wealth, there is indirect reli-
ance upon the land secretly held by others for the debtor.
Shouldn't this reliance be protected by recognizing the real owner
as the beneficial owner? While the grantor in certain states
need not plead that the agreement was in writing and will be
allowed to recover if the grantee fails to plead the Statute of
Frauds,34 can creditors of the grantor recover without pleading
and proving a written agreement if the original conveyance
was not fraudulent?
An additional factor that should not be ignored by the courts
when considering the enforcement of an oral trust is the danger
of self-help. A frustrated grantor who feels that he has been
betrayed, robbed and tricked by his straw man may take the
law into his own hands to try to secure the relief which equity
denies him.
B. Settlor's Creditors v. Straw Man
If the conveyance to the grantee was for the purpose of de-
frauding his creditors, it is clear that the grantee holds title as
trustee for the creditors of the grantor whether the agreement
to hold for the use of the grantor was written or oral. The chief
problem is proving that the transfer was fraudulent.
When the transfer of legal title to the straw man was not
fraudulent, 5 then the existing creditors can not have it set
aside. Later the solvent grantor may become insolvent unless
land held by the straw man can be reached by the grantor's
creditors. If the passive trust was in writing signed by the
grantee, then the Statute of Uses would execute the trust to
give the grantor legal title. It is only when the trust is not in
writing that the problem of reaching the land arises. Obviously,
if the court imposes a resulting or a constructive trust for one
34. "That it was not created by written evidence is a matter of defense
or to be raised by objection to the evidence offered to prove the trust."
Mugan v. Wheeler (1912) 241 Mo. 376, 382, 145 S. W. 462, 463.
"While under the older system of equity pleading it was required that a
complainant relying on a transaction which was governed by the Statute of
Frauds should show in his bill that there was a writing or that the statute
was otherwise satisfied, the modern authorities are strongly opposed to this
position." 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) 279, sec. 71.
35. An absolute conveyance of attachable property under a secret trust
for the grantor is considered fraudulent per se in a number of states.
Bellini v. Neas (1929) 50 R. I. 283, 146 Atl. 634, 68 A. L. R. 303. Cases
are collected in Note (1930) 68 A. L. R. 306.
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of the reasons previously enumerated, the creditors could reach
the legal interest through the debtor's equitable interest.36 But
when the court has previously held that the debtor had no equi-
table interest, is it going to deny relief to his creditors? If the
straw man is an honest person, he will stand ready to convey
on demand. Thus, to refuse to aid the debtor's creditors to reach
this land is to make the Statute of Frauds a means of defraud-
ing. The previously suggested solution of recognizing the true
owner as the beneficial or equitable owner would solve this
problem.
In Illinois there has developed a very unusual type of land
trust. The trust is created by conveying land to a trustee to hold
under conditions set forth in a separate unrecorded instrument.
This trust instrument provides that the interest of the benefi-
ciary shall be considered as personal property; that the benefi-
ciary shall have the absolute management of the property; that
the trustee will convey, mortgage, or deal with the property in
any other way at the written request of the beneficiary; that at
the end of twenty years the trustee will sell the land and dis-
tribute the proceeds to the holder of the trust certificate. In the
recent case of Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Mercantile Trust
and Savings Bank ,3 7 a judgment was secured against the benefi-
ciary of a land trust. After this judgment had been entered the
beneficiary authorized the trustee to execute a mortgage on the
land. In the contest between the judgment creditor and the
mortgagee, the court held that the judgment was not a lien on
the land because the beneficiary's interest was personalty and
not realty. The reasons given by the court for its decision are
not entirely satisfactory from a purely legal point of view. The
Statute of Uses was not applied because it was expressly stipu-
lated in the trust certificate that the interest of the beneficiary
was personalty and the Statute of Uses executes only trusts of
realty; and because the trustee had active duties to perform, viz.,
to convey upon the written order of the beneficiary and to sell
36. Although the general rule is that constructive and resulting trusts,
which are necessarily passive, are not executed by the Statute of Uses, in
Lahey v. Broderick (1903) 72 N. H. 180, 55 Atl. 354, the beneficiary of a
purchase-money trust was recognized as the legal owner.
For brief discussion of various ways of subjecting the beneficiary's in-
terest to payment of his debts, see 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935)
539, sec. 193.
37. (1939) 300 Ill. App. 329, 20 N. E. (2d) 992.
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the land at the end of a twenty year period, distributing the
proceeds.
Since the trustee held title to land in trust for the certificate
holder, how can it be said that this was not a trust of realty?
The mere fact that the trustee was obligated to convey when
ordered to do so would not mean that he had any obligations in
addition to those of a trustee of a passive trust.-8 The additional
obligation to sell the property at the end of a twenty year period
should not induce a court to refuse to apply the Statute of Uses
unless there is some policy favoring equitable interests.
The Illinois land trust, though somewhat of an anomaly, is
not in itself fraudulent. After a conveyance to a trustee the bene-
ficiary retains personalty equal in value to the land evidenced
by a certificate. This certificate is similar to a stock or bond
certificate and is about as alienable. It evidently represents a
new type of conveyancing developed by business men to meet
modern business needs.
In those states which have a statute similar to Kentucky's,3"
a judgment is a lien on the legal and equitable interests of the
judgment debtor and the result obtained by the Illinois court
could not have been attained. There are certainly some who favor
either making the equitable interest subject to the judgment
lien or placing legal title in the holder of the certicate by means
of the Statute of Uses. This would be the legal solution and the
one adopted in 1535. However, it is far from certain that this
would be the best way to solve the problem. Owners of land de-
sire the same secrecy, the same alienability, and the same free-
dom from judgment liens that owners of intangible property
now enjoy. Is there any reason why land owners should not be
given these rights? Is there something peculiar to the ownership
of land which requires that every one should know the name
of the owner, that it must be alienable only according to meth-
ods used when land was not the subject of commercial trans-
actions, and that it must be subject to judgment liens? In Illi-
nois, large corporations40 are engaged in the business of holding
title to land to give to owners of land the same rights that holders
38. 1 Scott, Trusts (1939) 19, see. 1.6.
39. Ky. Carroll's Stats. Ann. (1936) sec. 2355.
40. See Some Uses and Purposes of Land Trusts by Chicago Title &
Trust Company (1939). These coporate straw men solicit business by al-
vertising. See advertisement in (Sept. 1939) 25 A. B. A. J. ii.
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of stock certificates now enjoy. Only if the results obtained are
undesirable should they be abolished before a better system is
provided.
If it is desirable that owners of land should have the same
rights as owners of intangibles, then surely some system should
be devised to give to all land owners these rights. Why could not
the Torrens System of Land Registration4- and the Illinois Land
Trust be combined so as to give the owners of land, their credi-
tors, and subsequent purchasers the fullest possible protection
against fraud? Title could be registered in the name of some
public official who would issue a certificate of ownership to the
real owner. The record would state that title was held by this
public official in trust for certificate holder No. 11119.42 Judg-
ment creditors of the certificate holder could discover what
property was "owned" by him by simply filing a petition with
the public official setting forth their claims against the named
debtor and requesting information as to the property owned by
said debtor. Of course the petition would have to be supported
by an affidavit that the facts were true and correct. Such a sys-
tem should not be expensive, would make the land more alienable,
and ownership secret. However, it would not wholly eliminate
passive trusts because there would always be some who would
place their certificates in trust to defraud creditors or to try to
evade taxes.
C. Settlor v. Purchasers from Straw Man
When the owner of land, who is not in possession, conveys by
absolute deed to a straw man who orally agrees to reconvey on
demand but does not record his deed, there may arise the ques-
tion whether a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration
from the straw man receives title as against the real owner. In
those states where the straw man is trustee under a constructive
trust for the benefit of the true owner, the equitable interest of
the real owner would be extinguished by a transfer of the legal
title to a bona fide purchaser for value. If the grantor has no
41. See Uniform Land Registration Act (1932) 9 Unif. Laws Ann. 217
et seq.; McDougal and Brabner-Smith, Land Title Transfer: A Regression
(1939) 48 Yale L. J. 1125. But cf. Powell, Registration of the Title to
Land in the State of New York (1938).
42. Such a system would be somewhat similar to our method of issuing
federal currency.
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equitable interest then clearly the purchaser with or without
notice would prevail.
The more difficult problem arises when there is a written
agreement to reconvey, and neither the deed to the straw man
nor the written agreement is recorded. In such a case the grantor
would receive legal title under the Statute of Uses and the straw
man would have no interest in the land. Only if the purchaser
can bring himself within the protection of the recording acts
would he be entitled to the land. The written agreement would
be similar to an unrecorded deed from the grantee to the
grantor.43 Consequently, all persons protected under a particular
recording act would prevail as against this unrecorded written
instrument or deed. The fact that the record may indicate that
the grantor had title would not be material because his sub-
sequent deed, though unrecorded, would transfer this title to
the grantee as to those protected by the recording act.
If the real owner is not in possession and the deed to the straw
man is recorded, then clearly all persons protected by the record-
ing act would take free of any unrecorded written agreement or
unrecorded deed of reconveyance. 4
The most difficult case arises when the grantor remains in
possession and has either an equitable interest or legal title
under an unrecorded deed. It is immaterial whether the deed to
the straw man is recorded since bona fide purchasers for value
would be entitled to protection in either case provided the gran-
tor's possession was not constructive notice of his equitable or
legal interest. In those states where the possession of one claim-
ing an interest in the land is not constructive notice of his claim
to those persons protected under the recording act, such persons
would have rights superior to the grantor's.45 If possession does
constitute constructive notice, is the possession by the grantor
such notice? On this point the courts are divided. Some state
that the grantor's possession is never notice of his claim ;40 others
that it is always notice ;47 others that it is notice only after a
43. Bing v. People (1930) 254 N. Y. 484, 173 N. E. 687, 688.
44. Whitt v. Kentucky Oil Producing Co. (1928) 223 Ky. 348, 3 S. W.
(2d) 786.
45. Pomroy v. Stevens (1846) 11 Met. (Mass.) 244.
46. Clark v. Chapman (1931) 213 Iowa 737, 239 N. W. 797. Cases are
collected in Note (1936) 105 A. L. R. 845, 849.
47. Gallagher v. Northrup (1905) 215 Ill. 563, 74 N. E. 711. Cases are
collected in Note (1936) 105 A. L. R. 845, 846.
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reasonable time has elapsed.48 In any case, if it can be shown
that upon inquiry being made the grantor would have denied
having any interest in the land, then the purchaser would pre-
vail. The grantor's ability to testify in an action brought by
the grantee's purchaser that he would have disclosed his interest
if asked (though in fact he probably would not have done so)
gives him an unfair advantage and tends to promote perjury.
Therefore, the bona fide purchaser for value from the straw
man should be protected in all cases when the real owner or
his tenant remains or enters into possession after a voluntary
conveyance to a straw man under an oral trust to convey as
directed.49
If the straw man is in possession as tenant of the real owner,
then all bona fide purchasers for value from him should be pro-
tected. Also, if the "true owner" by word or act represents that
the straw man is the owner then he will be estopped from assert-
ing title as against bona fide purchasers for value.- General
reputation or rumor that land recorded in the name of a straw
man is owned by another is generally considered not to be
such notice as to deprive an otherwise bona fide purchaser for
value of the protection of the recording act.-
D. Settlor v. Creditors of Straw Man
Whenever the owner of land conveys bare legal title to a
straw man under an oral trust to convey as directed, it is prob-
able that the straw man's creditors will seek to have the land
sold to pay their claims. For purposes of analysis it will be
assumed that the true owner is not in possession, that he has
an equitable interest in the land, that the deed to the straw man
has been recorded, that the conveyance was not to defraud
creditors, and that the straw man has three classes of creditors.
The creditors of the straw man or grantee are, first, those who
extended credit prior to the deed to the straw man, second, those
48. Bennett v. Robinson (1873) 27 Mich. 26. Cases are collected in Note
(1936) 105 A. L. R. 892, 895.
49. When the grantor remains or enters into possession after a con-
veyance of title to secure a loan, he will declare to all who inquire that he
is the owner. Therefore, decisions protecting a mortgagor in possession
should not be used as authority to sustain a grantor's equitable or moral
rights under an oral trust to reconvey which was made to conceal his
identity.
50. 2 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 2134, sec. 546.
51. Note (1937) 109 A. L. R. 746.
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who extended credit subsequent to such deed but without rely-
ing on title in him, and third, those who did rely on title in the
straw man at the time of granting credit.
Since some recording acts protect only judgment creditors and
others protect neither judgment nor general creditors,5 2 another
reason must be found if the straw man's creditors are to be
granted rights which are superior to the equitable interest of
the true owner. General and judgment creditors of the straw
man who never relied on his title will not be protected.53 The
doctrine of estoppel is applied in some states to subordinate the
equitable interest to the right of all those who relied on title in
the straw man;" other states protect those relying only if the
straw man, with the express or implied consent of the real
owner, represented that he owned the land.5
If the grantor has only a moral right to the land, either be-
cause the transfer was fraudulent or because the agreement to
reconvey was oral, then all creditors of the straw man would
have rights superior to those of the original grantor so long as
the straw man retained title. Even those who extended credit
prior to the conveyance could reduce their claims to judgment
and have the land sold. Seldom would this happen, however,
because the grantee would reconvey to the "true owner" before
a lien could be secured. This reconveyance would raise the ques-
tion whether it was fraudulent and voidable if the straw man
was insolvent.
Whether a reconveyance by a straw man to the original grantor
is fraudulent as to the straw man's creditors depends upon the
attitude of the court toward moral consideration. If a transfer
to prefer one credit over another is fraudulent, then a transfer
to discharge a moral debt would likewise be fraudulent. If such
a transfer is not voidable for fraud, the court must then deter-
mine whether a moral debt is equivalent to a legal debt. At
least one court considers a moral obligation to be the same as
52. See Note (1913) 13 Col. L. Rev. 539.
53. Kingsbury v. Christy (1920) 21 Ariz. 559, 192 Pac. 1114; Citizens'
Bank v. Burrus (1903) 178 Mo. 716, 77 S. W. 748; 2 Scott, Trusts (1939)
1691, 1704, secs. 308.1, 313; Note (1911) 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 11.
54. Osborn v. Peace (D. C. E. D. N. Y. 1914) 215 Fed. 181; Goldberg v.
Parker (1913) 87 Conn. 99, 87 Atl. 555, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1097.
55. Stone v. Stitt (1910) 62 Tex. Civ. App. 492, 132 S. W. 862; Restate-
ment, Trusts (1935) see. 313. For other cases see 2 Scott, Trusts (1939)
1707, n. 10.
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a legal debt and the reconveyance not fraudulent. 6 Those courts
which sustain a reconveyance to a fraudulent grantor, whether
or not the straw man's creditors relied, on the ground that the
rights of the fraudulent grantor's creditors are superior to the
rights of the straw man's creditors aid the fraudulent grantor
because his creditors will likely never benefit.5 7 However, there
is a tendency to protect creditors of the straw man who have
relied on his ownership as against the grantor.58 The attitude
of a number of courts, which say they represent the majority,
may be illustrated by considering somewhat at length a case59
involving an actual fraudulent conveyance to a straw man, fol-
lowed by a reconveyance.
One 0 owned a certain farm. To defraud his creditors, 0 con-
veyed title to his son, A, who orally agreed to reconvey on de-
mand. A was sued for breach of promise and judgment entered
against him, but before the judgment became a lien on the land
A reconveyed to his father, 0, who promptly conveyed to another
son, B. The court described the interest of son A prior to his
reconveyance as follows:
The son held the full legal title, and he held the equitable
title, as against all the world except the creditors of the
father. They, so far as we know, never at any time sought
to disturb the title of the son. The land in the hands of the
son was subject to his debts. Had a creditor of his obtained
judgment against him while the title stood in his name, the
judgment would have been a lien upon the land, and no
transfer to the father could have affected the lien. * * *
In other words, in a contest between the creditors of the
grantor and the creditors of the grantee, the former will
succeed. * * * This shows that the property rights of the
vendor have not been extinguished. But the law, for rea-
sons of public policy and to discourage fraudulent convey-
ances, will not permit him to assert them. If, then, these
property rights exist; if the grantor purchased and paid
for the property, and has never received anything therefor
from the grantee; if the only right or equity that the grantee
has in the property in his right to claim the protection of
a technical rule of law that will not permit him to be
56. Bicocchi v. Casey-Swasey Co. (1897) 91 Tex. 259, 42 S. V. 963.
57. Bicocchi v. Casey-Swasey Co. (1897) 91 Tex. 259, 42 S. W. 963. But
cf. McHugh v. Lasco (1938) 255 App. Div. 1025, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 605.
58. Susong v. Williams (1870) 48 Tenn. 625; see Lockren v. Rustan
(1899) 9 N. D. 43, 81 N. W. 60, 62.
59. Lockren v. Rustan (1899) 9 N. D. 43, 81 N. W. 60.
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attacked, not by reason of any rights in him, but solely on
the ground of public policy,-it must follow that, in good
conscience and morals, the grantee ought to reconvey to the
grantor, if the latter so request.60
The North Dakota court gave as its reason for refusing to
set aside the reconveyance to 0 that A was under a moral duty
to 0 to reconvey, that A's creditor did not rely on title in A, that
A's creditor had no lien, that 0 did not request the reconveyance
to prevent A's creditor from collecting her judgment but to pro-
tect the land from the judgment. An additional reason not ex-
pressly stated in the opinion but which seems to have been pres-
ent in the minds of the judges was their feeling that a judgment
for breach of promise was not a desirable type of claim. Since
suits are not usually instituted against judgment-proof defend-
ants, can it be said that the action for breach of promise was
not brought against A because he had title to the land? 1 Should
this type of reliance be protected where its extent would be the
cost of maintaining the suit and not the amount of judgment
secured? The distinction made by the court between an intent
to defraud A's creditors and an intent to protect O's property
is practically impossible of determination and probably does not
exist.
Although the moral obligation is primarily to the grantor's
creditors instead of the fraudulent grantor, the courts make no
provision for protecting these creditors when sustaining a re-
conveyance.6 2 Nor are creditors of the grantor protected by
courts which set aside the reconveyance because they find no
moral duty to reconvey. 3
Judge Learned Hand gives as the sole reason for upholding a
reconveyance on the ground of moral obligation the principle
of stare decisis. In Bryant v. Klatt,64 he said:
60. Lockren v. Rustan (1899) 9 N. D. 43, 81 N. W. 60, 61.
61. Cf. "The cause of action having been a tort, the ground of estoppel,
which is sometimes found in cases in which the claim is upon contract, and
credit has been given on the belief that the debtor was the true owner of
property of which he had the legal title only, but not the equitable title, is
not found here." Lillis v. Gallagher (1884) 39 N. J. Eq. 93, 95.
62. Berg and Co. v. Frantz (1902) 113 Ky. 888, 69 S. W. 801; Bicocchi v.
Casey-Swasey Co. (1897) 91 Tex. 259, 42 S. W. 963.
63. Keel v. Larkin (1887) 83 Ala. 142, 3 So. 296; Chapin v. Pease (1834)
10 Conn. 69; Walton v. Tusten (1873) 49 Miss. 569.
64. (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1924) 2 F. (2d) 167, 168. Cf. Moran v. Morgan
(C. C. A. 2, 1918) 252 Fed. 719.
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The conveyance on the eve of bankruptcy was, they claim,
as much of a fraud on them as though the land had been
bought with their money. Perhaps this ought to be the law,
but in fact it is not. While as against the grantee the cestui
que trust has no rights which he can enforce, still if the
grantee chooses to recognize his "moral" obligations, as it
is called, his creditors may not complain. The courts seem
to have been able to endure the spectacle of a man who in
his own interest defrauds a confiding fellow, but to stick
at allowing the same privilege to his creditors. Whatever
may be thought of the logic of the distinction, it is well
settled.65
Can it be said that the certainty of bad law is better than the
chance of a good decision?
In Lockren v. Rustan, the court was reminded that after A
reconveyed to his father, 0, 0 conveyed the bare legal title to B,
another son, to defraud O's creditors. The court said of this
transfer:
It is clear to us that in deeding the property to another son
he acted ex abundanti cautela, and in the mistaken belief
that he was thus placing another barrier between his
property and the danger that menaced it.,6
Yet it had previously stated in speaking of the conveyance to
the son, A, to defraud O's creditors that the creditors, "so far
as we know, never at any time sought to disturb the title of the
son." 67 Here we have stated the attitude of many courts toward
these fraudulent transfers. It is assumed that no one can de-
fraud his creditors by a conveyance to a straw man or dummy.
This assumption ignores the fact that most of the evidence to
prove fraud must come from the grantor's friends; that fraud
must be proved by clear and concise evidence; that an action to
set aside a fraudulent conveyance will frequently cost more than
the amount owed to individual creditors without any assurance
of success; that often creditors are not organized; and that the
decisions of the court frequently aid those who have others hold
legal title to land so that their prior or subsequent creditors can
65. Is this what Professor Warren has described as "an unreasoning ad-
herence to an unreasonable rule?" Warren, Cases on Property (2d ed.
1938).
66. (1899) 9 N. D. 43, 81 N. W. 60, 64.
67. (1899) 9 N. D. 43, 81 N. W. 60, 61. In Creetknur v. Creektnur
(1881) 75 Va. 430, the fraudulent grantor remained in possession forty-
seven years and secured title by adverse possessionl
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not reach it. There are no policemen to discover fraudulent con-
veyances and concealed titles. In an Iowa case,"8 a father con-
veyed to his son certain land for a recited consideration of $2500.
Later when the creditors of the son became active the son re-
conveyed. It was proved that the son had not paid any of the
recited consideration and that the reconveyance was to dis-
charge the debt owed to the father. Therefore, the court found
nothing fraudulent in the transaction since preferring one cred-
itor over another was not fraudulent. The courts should realize
that the testimony of the true owner depends upon whether his
or the straw man's creditors are trying to reach the property.
If the original grantor's creditors should be protected in actions
to set aside a reconveyance, then the straw man's creditors
ought to prove that all of the real owner's creditors who were
defrauded have been notified and requested to intervene to pro-
tect their interests. After these creditors of the real owner
have been brought into the case, the property fraudulently con-
veyed should be distributed as follows: first, to creditors, if any,
of the straw men who are protected under the recording acts;
second, to creditors of the real owner who were defrauded, if
not guilty of laches; third, to judgment creditors of the straw
man who have liens on the property; fourth, to those creditors of
the straw man who relied; and fifth, to the real owner.60
When the dispute is between the creditors of the real owner
and those of the straw man, it has been held that the creditors
of the real owner have the superior rights.70 In these cases the
creditors of the real owner were not dilatory. Yet, in the deci-
sions there are frequent dicta 7' that seem to assume that credi-
68. First Nat'l Bank of McGregor v. Hostetter (1883) 61 Iowa 395, 16
N. W. 289.
69. If the original conveyance was not fraudulent and the grantor has
an equitable interest the order of distribution should be as follows: First,
to creditors of grantor and grantee protected under the recording act in
the order of their priority; second, to judgment creditors of the grantee who
relied; third, to general creditors of grantee who relied; fourth, to creditors
of grantor; fifth, to grantor.
Ordinarily a judgment is only a lien on the interest of the debtor and is
not prior to the rights of a beneficiary of an express, constructive, or re-'
sulting trust. 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) 434, sec. 146; 2 Scott,
Trusts (1939) 1691, sec. 308.1; Restatement, Trusts (1935) sec. 308.
70. Mullanphy Savings Bank v. Lyle (1881) 75 Tenn. 431 (no recording
act involved); see Clark's Adm'r v. Rucker (1847) 46 Ky. 583, 584 (fraudu-
lent conveyance of slaves).
71. "In a contest between the creditors of the grantor and the creditors
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tors of a fraudulent grantor will always prevail over the straw
man's creditors. If the real owner's creditors have not set aside
the fraudulent conveyance for the period which constitutes
laches, then all creditors of the straw man who have relied should
be protected. It might be better to require the creditors of the
fraudulent grantor to have the conveyance set aside within a
period much shorter than the period that constitutes laches to
protect the straw man's creditors.7 2
PURCHASE-MONEY TRUSTS
One of the most numerous resulting trusts is the purchase-
money trust.7 3 It arises from the paying of the purchase price
and taking title in the name of a third person who is not related
by blood or marriage so as to raise a presumption of a gift.7'
This type of resulting trust may be used because the real pur-
chaser desires to conceal his identity to purchase the land, or to
defraud his creditors 7 5 or to limit his liability by having a note
and mortgage executed by the third person, or for numerous
other possible reasons.
It was early decided in New York that the courts had made
a mistake when they recognized purchase-money trusts. This
type of resulting trust was evidently used frequently to defraud
existing and future creditors. Therefore a statute was enacted
abolishing the purchase-money trust and making the third per-
son or straw man a trustee for the creditors of the real pur-
chaser.78 If there are no creditors, the third person retains both
of the grantee, the former will succeed." Lockren v. Rustan (1899) 9 N. D.
43, 81 N. W. 60, 62.
72. The cases considering the statute of limitations or laches as applied
to actions to set aside a fraudulent conveyance are collected in Note (1932)
76 A. L. R. 864.
73. Professor Bogert states that he has examined over 2400 American
cases dealing with the purchase-money trust. 2 Bogert, Trusts and Tmustees
(1935) sec. 454, n. 32.
74. See Scott, Resulting Trusts Arising Upon The Purchase of Land
(1927) 40 Harv. L. Rev. 669; Restatement, Trusts (1935) secs. 440-460.
75. The problems arising when title is taken in the name of a third
person to defraud the real purchaser's creditors are the same as those dis-
cussed in connection with fraudulent conveyances. The cases are collected
in Note (1938) 117 A. L. R. 1464.
76. "A grant of real property for a valuable consideration, to one per-
son, the consideration being paid by another, is presumed fraudulent as
against the creditors, at that time, of the person paying the consideration,
and, unless a fraudulent intent is disproved, a trust results in favor of such
creditors, to an extent necessary to satisfy their just demands; but the title
vests in the grantee, and no use or trust results from the pdyment to the
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legal and equitable title. This is no hardship on the real owner
if the third person is a dummy corporation organized and con-
trolled by him for the purpose of holding title to land. Those
persons who cannot afford a dummy corporation can still take
title in the name of a third person and rely on his moral duty
to convey as directed. In either case there is always the danger
that the straw man's creditors may have the land sold to satisfy
their claims, since a conveyance to the real owner would be set
aside in New York as fraudulent, provided the straw man would
be left insolvent.77 However, the New York courts have con-
strued the statute to give an equitable interest to the one paying
the price if there has been part performance, conversion of the
realty into personalty by a sale, a written trust, or a confidential
relationship between the one paying the price and the grantee.78
Some New York banks, real estate dealers, and others, have
dummy corporations take title to land purchased by them. 9 In
addition to enabling the real purchaser to use the land in ways
that would not have been permissible if title had been taken in
his or its own name, there is no liability under deficiency judg-
ments rendered against the dummy corporation on notes signed
by it. If title is taken in the name of such dummy corporation
and the note and mortgage duly signed by it, and title is then
transferred to the bank or real purchaser, a deficiency judgment
could not reach any of its assets. But should the bank neglect
to have title transferred to itself then a deficiency judgment
against the dummy corporation would reach other land held for
the bank, and this could not be prevented by a conveyance of
title to the bank prior to the entering of the judgment.8 0 Thus
person paying the consideration, or in his favor, unless the grantee either,
1. Takes the same as an absolute conveyance, in his own name, without
the consent or knowledge of the person paying the consideration; or,
2. In violation of some trust, purchases the property so conveyed with
money or property belonging to another." N. Y. Cahill's Consol. Laws(1930) c. 51, sec. 94.
Other states which have statutes similiar to New York's are: Ky.
Carroll's Stats. Ann. (1936) sec. 2353; Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) sec. 12,
973-12,975; Minn. Mason's Stats. (1927) secs. 8086-8088; Wis. Stats.(1937) secs. 231.07-231.09. In Kentucky the one paying the purchase price
may recover this amount from the grantee. Martin v. Martin (1868) 68
Ky. 47.
77. Fraw Realty Co. v. Natanson (1933) 261 N. Y. 396, 185 N. E. 679.
78. See Powell, Cases on Possessory Estates (1933) 520-522.
79. See Northern Bank of N. Y. v. Washington Say. Bank (1916) 172
App. Div. 341, 158 N. Y. S. 497.
80. Fraw Realty Co. v. Natanson (1933) 261 N. Y. 396, 185 N. E. 679.
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the effect would be almost the same as if the bank had signed
the note except that the liability would be restricted to the land
held in the name of the dummy corporation. If the dummy cor-
poration which executes notes and mortgages immediately trans-
fers title to the bank after the note and mortgage have been
sold, there will arise the question whether one who secures a
deficiency judgment against the dummy corporation under a
prior or subsequent note can reach the land thus transferred
to the bank. Since under the New York statute the dummy cor-
poration and the bank are separate legal entities with legal and
equitable title in the dummy corporation prior to the conveyance
to the bank, the problem is really the usual one which arises in
every case involving fraudulent conveyances-was the convey-
ance fraudulent as to the plaintiff?
If the bank required the dummy corporation to execute a
written memorandum stating that it held title as trustee for
the bank, then the bank would have the legal interest under the
Statute of Uses, assuming the trust was passive.8' If the trust
was active, then the bank would have only the equitable interest.
If the dummy corporation was solvent at the time of executing
the memorandum, then the gift would not be fraudulent; if the
corporation would be left insolvent, then the gift would be fraud-
ulent. The problems are the same as in conveyance of legal title
to the bank.
Statutes in some states raise a presumption that the title was
placed in the name of the third person in order to defraud credi-
tors of the real purchaser.8 2 Where this presumption is rebutted,
or where there is no statute, the equitable interest of the real
purchaser would be prior in time to the rights of creditors of
the third party. Being prior in time, only the creditors of the
third party who relied should be protected.
If the real purchaser desires to conceal his identity from the
vendor, he will have the straw man, who is now an agent for an
undisclosed principal, buy the land in his own name with money
furnished by his principal. From the purchaser's point of view,
the transaction is simply a purchase-money trust; from the ven-
dor's point of view the transaction is a contract with or convey-
ance to the agent of an undisclosed principal.
81. Bing v. People (1930) 254 N. Y. 484, 173 N. E. 687.
82. Ind. Stats. (1934) see. 14,739-14,741; Kan. Gen. Stats. (1935) c. 67,
sees. 406-408.
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If A, the agent of P, the undisclosed principal, represents to
the vendor, V, that A is buying the property for X, it is clear
that a conveyance to A or a contract with A made because of
the misrepresentation can be set aside for fraud. 3 Not only
would the contract be induced by fraud but there would be such
a mistake as to the identity of the purchaser that the contract
would be wholly void for want of two parties,84 unless A was
personally bound, in which case it would be voidable by V. This
result would follow whether or not V would have sold to P.
Usually there are additional factors in this type of case to justify
rescission and a right to a reconveyance.
When P knows that V will not sell to him at any price he may
employ A to buy the land in A's name. If V owns other land in
the neighborhood and P desires to use the land purchased from
V in such a way as to reduce the market value of the land re-
tained, then V would be entitled to relief because of the fraud
and actual damage 5 In this type of case there is generally a
misrepresentation as to the identity of the real purchaser and
as to how the land will be used.""
A more difficult problem arises when V does not own other
land in the neighborhood and would not suffer any pecuniary
loss if P used the land for purposes other than those declared
by A. If V had no objection to selling to P at the price paid by A,
then the right of V to dispose of his property to whom he pleases
has not been damaged. If, however, V did not object to selling
to P at any price and P or A knew this fact, in most states V
would be entitled to rescind the contract or to a reconveyance
of title if a deed has been executed and delivered to A.8 So long
83. Brett v. Cooney (1902) 75 Conn. 338, 53 At. 729; 5 Williston, Con-
tracts (Rev. ed. 1937) 4269, sec. 1525; Restatement, Agency (1935) secs.
263, 339, 369; Restatement, Contracts (1932) see. 481, comment c.
84. 5 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1937) 4240, sec. 1517; Restatement,
Agency (1935) see. 369; Restatement, Agency (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1931)
176.
85. Thompson v. Barry (1903) 184 Mass. 429, 68 N. E. 674; Coan v.
Consolidated Gas Electric Light and Power Co. (1915) 126 Md. 506, 95
Atl. 151.
86. For collection of cases on misrepresentation as to intended use of
land, see Note (1911) 20 Ann. Cas. 913.
87. Morrow v. Ursini (1921) 96 Conn. 219, 113 Atl. 388; Siess v. Ander-
son (1911) 159 Mo. App. 656, 139 S. W. 1178; Archer v. Stone (1898) 78
L. T. R. (N. S.) 34. Restatement, Agency (1935) see. 304; cf. sec. 292,
comment c. See McCleary, Damage as Requisite to Rescission for Mis-
representation: II (1937) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 227, 244 et seq. Contra: Lashley
v. Lashley (1924) 205 Ky. 601, 266 S. W. 247.
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as title has not been transferred to a bona fide purchaser for
value or one entitled to the protection of the recording act, there
is no reason why a court should not compel a reconveyance.
But, if V learns the identity of the real purchaser before execut-
ing and delivering the deed, a conveyance to the real purchaser
or his agent would constitute a waiver of the right to compel a
reconveyance. The vendor should have rescinded the contract
and refused to convey.88
Although V may have objected to selling to P at any price,
he would have no grounds for rescission or for a reconveyance if
at the time of the contract neither A nor P knew this fact. It
is permissible for an agent to represent that he is not acting
for any one so long as this is not done to induce third persons
to deal with him when it is known by the agent or his principal
that these persons would not deal with the principal. Conse-
quently, in all of these cases involving the use of a straw man
to purchase land for one to whom the vendor would not sell at
any price,89 the validity of the transactions depends upon whether
the principal or his agent knew that the vendor would not sell to
the principal and whether the agent represented that he was
not acting for P. Of course, if A said he was acting for X, then
the case would come under those considered earlier. If A can
buy from V the land desired by P without representing that he
is agent for one other than P and without expressly or impliedly
representing that he is not acting for P, the transaction is per-
fectly valid and free from fraud. 0 Thus the duty is placed upon
the owner of the property to inquire of the one seeking to buy
whether he is acting for himself or for an undisclosed principal
and the name of such undisclosed principal.
Suppose that A, a member of the white race, purchases land
in an exclusive residential area for P, a member of the negro
race. If A does not represent that he is buying the land for
himself, or for P or for any other person, can V rescind on the
88. Whitney v. Allaire (1847) 4 Denio (N. Y.) 554, aff'd (1848) 1 N. Y.
305, 4 How. Prac. 447; 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (1918) 1863,
sec. 897.
89. If V would have sold to P at the price A agreed to pay, V would
have no cause for rescission though A stated that he was not buying the
land for P. Diamond v. Shriver (1911) 114 Md. 643, 80 At. 217; Smith v.
Wheatcroft (1878) 9 Ch. D. 223.
90. Cole v. Hunter Tract Improvement Co. (1910) 61 Wash. 365, 112 Pac.
368, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 125; Dyster v. Randall and Sons [1926] 1 Ch. 932.
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ground of fraud?91 In such a transaction V assumed that A was
buying the land for his own use or for an undisclosed principal
of the white race. Since this assumption is a natural one, should
not the burden be placed upon A to disclose to V the race of the
real purchaser, and any other unusual circumstances connected
with the purchase?
Occasionally a school, church, hospital or other charitable in-
stitution may desire -to purchase adjoining land to be used in
connection with the institution. If the owners of the land object
to selling to the charitable institution, should the court sustain
a purchase through a third party because the public would
benefit if the institution could acquire title? In a few cases a
decision of this type might possibly be justified on the ground
that the institution could have acquired title by eminent domain
proceedings. This reason could not be given where such power
could not be employed by the charitable institution.
It is possible to make a transaction technically legal without
securing results different from those obtained by an illegal one.
If the institution suggests to a friend that it would like to have
land owned by V, and the friend then purchases this land with
his own money, stating that he is not the agent of any one, there
is nothing illegal in a subsequent sale to the institution. While
the friend was morally obligated to sell to the institution at the
price he paid, he is not legally bound to do so. Consequently, the
-court could sustain this transaction.9 2 If sustained because the
friend of the institution was the real purchaser, would a court
refuse to sustain a similar transaction if the use of the land
would be detrimental to adjoining owners?
There remains to be considered the case where V is willing and
perhaps eager to sell to P, but at a price far in excess of the
price asked of others. 93 This type of case may arise from the
reputed wealth of P, or from the fact that V knows P needs his
land and intends to refuse to sell unless he receives a very high
price for it. P may be a factory that intends to buy rural land
91. Cf. Cole v. Hunter Tract Improvement Company (1910) 61 Wash.
365, 112 Pac. 368, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 125.
92. Nash v. Dix (1898) 78 L. T. R. (N. S.) 445.
93. A was employed to buy land for a railroad. Plaintiff orally agreed
to sell his land to A for $8,500. When plaintiff learned that the land was
to be used for railroad purposes he successfully demanded $18,000 by re-
fusing to convey for $8,500 because the contract was not in writing. Wei-
gold v. Pittsburg, C. & W. R. R. (1904) 208 Pa. 81, 57 At. 188.
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at the price of such land for farming purposes. All the owners
are willing to sell to P, but if they knew all the facts they would
demand a higher price. Therefore, P employs a straw man to
buy this land, not recording any deeds until all the desired land
has been secured. Then the straw man conveys to P. The
vendors immediately seek to have their deeds set aside on the
ground that A said he was buying the land for himself, and that
he was not buying the land for P.
The first question that must be decided is the market value of
the land. It may be contended that the price expected from P
was the true value of the farming land because it was suitable
for industrial use. This argument assumes that P must have
this particular land. Usually P does not need the particular
land and found it suitable for industrial use because of the low
cost per acre. The price of the land is one of the factors that
must be considered in determining whether it is suitable for
industrial use. If the value of the land for farming purposes is
$100 per acre and this price was used to determine the location
of a factory, it can hardly be said that the owners of the land
should be entitled to $200 per acre. If the courts should treat
a purchase by A for P as fraudulent, entitling V to rescind,
would this promote the public welfare? If not, should this fact
influence the court in determining what is or is not fraudulent?
The decisions on this point have treated misrepresentations as
to the identity of the real purchaser as not fraudulent where V
had no objection to selling to the real purchaser but simply
wanted a higher price.04
It is becoming increasingly necessary to sell land by employing
a real estate broker to procure purchasers willing and able to
pay the desired price. It may safely be assumed that real estate
brokers greatly assist both vendor and purchaser in the sale of
land and should be protected as much as possible by the courts.
If 0 owns land worth $80,000 and desires to sell it, he will
likely give several brokers the right to sell the land for a certain
commission. Assuming that the commission promised is two
per cent and that 0 has reserved the right to sell directly to
persons not procured by the broker, 0 will be willing to sell for
$78,400 if he is sure that he will not have to pay the broker's
94. Standard Steel Car Co. v. Stamm (1904) 207 Pa. 419, 56 Atl. 954.
Restatement, Agency (Tent. Draft. No. 6, Explanatory Notes, 1931) 180.
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commission. A number of decisions have placed upon 0 the
duty of asking the brokers and the purchaser to learn whether
he was interested in the land by one of the brokers.05 This view
seems to be preferable to the attitude of those courts which
protect a broker only if the vendor actually knew that the pur-
chaser had been procured by the broker.9
If the vendor tries to defraud the broker of his commission by
selling to a straw man who will later convey to a purchaser pro-
cured by the broker, all courts will protect the broker by allow-
ing him to recover his commission in an action against the
vendor."
If the broker desires to buy the land for himself and also to
secure a commission by selling to a straw man who will later
convey to the broker or to a purchaser at an increased price, all
courts will deny the broker his commission and will award to the
vendor all profits realized by the broker.98
The real problem arises when the purchaser procured by the
broker employs a straw man to offer to buy the land from the
vendor. If the vendor inquires of the broker he will learn that
the broker did not procure the straw man; if the vendor inquires
of the straw man whether he is buying for another, the vendor
will be told that he is not. After the vendor has sold to the
straw man for $78,400, he learns that the real purchaser was
one procured by the broker. It is quite clear that the real pur-
chaser has received the $1600 commission which should have
been paid to the broker. Therefore, if the court permits the
broker to recover his commission from the vendor,"" the vendor
should be permitted to recover $1600 from the real purchaser,
in addition to the purchase price of $78,400. To avoid circuity
of action the broker should be allowed to recover $1600 in a
95. Hight v. Marshall (1916) 124 Ark. 512, 187 S. W. 433; Adams v.
Decker (1899) 34 Ill. App. 17; Hovey & Brown v. Aaron (1908) 133 Mo.
App. 718, 113 S. W. 718; Sussdorff v. Schmidt (1873) 55 N. Y. 319. Cases
are collected in Note (1908) 9 Ann. Cas. 433.
96. Offutt & Oldham v. Winters (1928) 227 Ky. 56, 11 S. W. 979; Quist
v. Goodfellow (1906) 99 Minn. 509, 110 N. W. 65 (purchase through straw
man).
97. Butler v. Ouwelant (1903) 90 Conn. 434, 97 Atl. 310; Lorton v. Trail(Mo. App. 1919) 216 S. W. 54.
98. Van Raalte v. Epstein (1906) 202 Mo. 173, 99 S. W. 1077. The
principal's remedies and the cases are set forth in Note (1929) 62 A. L. R.
63.
99. Glade v. Eastern Ill. Mining Co. (1908) 129 Mo. App. 443, 107 S. W.
1002; Schultz v. Zelman (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) 111 S. W. 776.
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tort action against the real purchaser for interfering with the
broker's contractual rights.100 Those courts 0 1 which have denied
relief to the broker in an action against the vendor have not
declared that there could be no recovery in an action by the
broker against the real purchaser. If the courts desire to protect
the broker, purchasers should not be permitted to defeat his
right to a commission by using a straw man.
The rule suggested in the Restatement of Agency is one which
protects the vendor if he uses due care and one which can be
adopted by most states by distinguishing or explaining earlier
decisions. In section 448, comment f, the rule is thus stated:
If care upon the part of the principal would not have re-
vealed the connection between the broker and the customer,
and the principal makes a lower price because of his belief
that he would not have to pay commissions, the broker's
compensation is reduced to the extent that the price has been
thereby lowered, as where the customer acts through a
straw man who purports to be buying on his own account.
If the vendor used due care to ascertain the identity of the real
purchaser then the broker could recover from the real pur-
chaser or his agent any loss caused by their defrauding him of
his commission.102
When the vendor learns the identity of the real purchaser
before executing and delivering the deed to the straw man, the
broker should be entitled to the commission if the vendor con-
veys. The vendor could protect himself by refusing to convey
for any price less than the contract price plus the broker's com-
mission. 0 3 A conveyance for the contract price would probably
indicate that the land could not be sold to any one at the contract
price plus the broker's commission and that the vendor would
not lose by paying a commission to the broker.
100. Skene v. Carayanis (1926) 103 Conn. 708, 131 Atl. 497. Cf. Gormley
v. Dangel (1913) 214 Mass. 5, 100 N. E. 1084 (real purchaser secured right
to sell land for commission then sold to his own straw man. Broker awarded
commission in action against real purchaser).
101. Ritch v. Robertson (1920) 93 Conn. 459, 106 Atl. 509, 7 A. L. R.
81; Stone v. Kreis (1916) 202 Ill. App. 43; Goldstein v. Walter (N. Y. City
Com. Pleas 1889) 15 Daly 397, 7 N. Y. S. 756.
102. Skene v. Carayanis (1926) 103 Conn. 708, 131 Atl. 497.
103. See Skene v. Carayanis (1926) 103 Conn. 708, 131 Atl. 497, 498
(vendor could rescind and refuse to convey). Contra: Quist v. Goodfellow
(1906) 99 Minn. 509, 110 N. W. 65 (vendor could not rescind and refuse
to convey).
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STRAW MEN AS CONDUITS OF TITLE
At common law it was necessary to use a third party to convey
property to certain persons. If a husband desired to convey
title to his wife, he had to convey first to another person who
would then convey to the wife. The unity of person associated
with the marital status prevented a direct conveyance, for one
could not convey to himself.0 4 However, even before the adop-
tion of statutes permitting a direct conveyance from one spouse
to the other, some equity courts sustained such deeds by holding
that the husband held the legal title in trust for his wife, the
grantee.105 Upon the death of either spouse the legal title vested
in the wife or her heirs because there was no longer any reason
for continuing the trust.0 6
Today many states have statutes which expressly permit a con-
veyance from one spouse to the other.1oT Other states have
properly held that the statutes permitting married women to
convey their separate property allow conveyances between
104. 3 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 2330. Cf. "It is not possible
under existing law for a man to make a contract with himself." Restate-
ment, Contracts (1932) see. 15, comment a.
105. Wilkerson v. Powell (1927) 173 Ark. 33, 291 S. W. 799; Carson v.
Berthold & Jennings Lumber Co. (1917) 270 Mo. 238, 192 S. W. 1018.
Contra: Price v. Brittain (1923) 80 Ind. App. 294, 137 N. E. 620.
106. Wilkerson v. Powell (1927) 173 Ark. 33, 291 S. W. 799; Carson v.
Berthold & Jennings Lumber Co. (1917) 270 Mo. 238, 192 S. W. 1018.
107. Ala. Code (1928) sec. 8272; Osborne v. Cooper (1896) 113 Ala. 405,
21 So. 320; Ark. Dig. Stats. (Pope's 1937) sec. 1866. Cal. Deerings' Civil
Code (1931) sec. 158; D. C. Code (1929) tit. 14, see. 25; Fla. Comp.
Gen. Laws (1927) see. 5670; Fla. Const. art. X, sec. 1; Jordan v. Jordan
(1931) 100 Fla. 1586, 132 So. 466 (only homestead cannot be conveyed from
one spouse to the other); Ill. Rev. Stats. (1937) c. 68, sec. 9; Iowa Code
(1935) see. 10449; Me. Rev. Stats. (1930) c. 74, sec. 1; Md. Code Ann.
(1924) art. 45, sec. 1; Mass. Gen. Laws (1932) c. 209, sec. 3; Mont. Rev.
Code (1935) see. 5786; Nev. Comp. Laws (1929) see. 3373; N. H. Pub.
Laws (1926) c. 288, sec. 5; N. J. Rev. Stats. (1937) tit. 37, c. 2, see. 18;
N. M. Stats. Ann. (1929) c. 68, sec. 201; Duncan v. Brown (1914) 18 N. M.
579, 139 Pac. 140; N. Y. Cahill's Consol. Laws (1930) c. 14, sec. 56; N. D.
Comp. Laws (1913) sec. 4411; Ohio Ann. Code (Throckmorton's 1936)
sec. 7999; Ore. Code Ann. (1935 Supp.) tit. 33, c. 2, sec. 203; Pa. Purdon's
Stats. (1936) tit. 48, sec. 71; R. I. Gen. Laws (1938) c. 417, sec. 4; S. C.
Const. art. XVII, sec. 9; see Green v. Cannady (1907) 77 S. C. 193, 57 S. E.
832, 834; S. D. Comp. Laws (1929) see. 171; Tex. Const. art. XVI, sec. 50;
Tex. Vernon's Stats. Ann. (1914) art. 1115; Martin v. Barnum (Tex. Civ.
App. 1926) 286 S. W. 550, semble; Utah Rev. Stats. (1933) tit. 45, sec. 1;
Wash. Remington's Comp. Stats. (1922) sees. 5828, 10,572; W. Va. Code
(Mitchie's 1937) sec. 4737; Wis. Stats. (1937) sec. 246.03; Wyo. Rev. Stats.
(1931) c. 69, sec. 101, semble.
Cf. Del. Rev. Code (1935) sec. 3541 (H and W may contract with each
other); Okla. Comp. Stats. (1931) sec. 1655 (H and W may contract with
each other).
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spouses. 10 8 Only a few states do not permit such conveyances
and, consequently, in those states a straw man must be used.109
Unfortunately many states which permit direct conveyances
between spouses have made no provision for a conveyance from
one spouse to himself and the other spouse as joint tenants or
as tenants by the entireties. It is well known that in some
states"0 the Married Woman's Property Acts have been held
to have abolished estates by the entireties through the destruc-
tion of the unity of person, and that in other states" the statutes
abolishing the presumption of a joint tenancy have been con-
strued so as to prevent the creation of estates by the entireties.
In these cases, too, a straw man would be required as a conduit
of title. It has been contended that where there is a conveyance
to a straw man for the purpose of having him convey to husband
and wife as tenants by the entireties or as joint tenants, the
Statute of Uses will execute the use so as to make the husband
and wife tenants in common even though the straw man con-
veyed to them as tenants by the entireties or as joint tenants.
This argument has not been accepted and the trust has been
considered an active one, being for a special purpose.
12
108. Ariz. Rev. Code (1928) sec. 2174; Luhrs v. Hancock (1899) 6 Ariz.
340, 57 Pac. 605, aff'd (1901) 181 U. S. 567; Colo. Stats. (1935) c. 108, sec.
10; Wells v. Caywood (1877) 3 Colo. 487; Ind. Stats. (1934) sec. 5645;
Price v. Brittain (1923) 80 Ind. App. 294, 137 N. E. 620 (H must join in
deed of W to H); Kan. Const. art. XV, sec. 6; Kan. Gen. Stats. (1935)
c. 23, sec. 201; Brecheisen v. Clark (1918) 103 Kan. 662, 176 Pac. 137;
Craine v. Edwards (1891) 92 Ky. 109, 17 S. W. 211 (H can convey di-
rectly to W); Sayers v. Coleman (1872) 5 Ky. Op. 733 (W can not convey
directly to H because H must join in deed and he can not convey to him-
self); Mich. Comp. Laws (1929) sec. 13,057; Burdeno v. Amperse (1866)
14 Mich. 91, 97; Miss. Code Ann. (1930) sec. 1940; Virden v. Dwyer (1901)
78 Miss. 763, 30 So. 45; R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 2998; Smelser v. Meier
(1917) 271 Mo. 178, 196 S. W. 22; Neb. Comp. Stats. (1929) c. 42, sec. 202;
Lavigne v. Tobin (1897) 52 Neb. 686, 72 N. W. 1015; N. C. Const. art. X,
sec. 6; McLamb v. McPhail (1900) 126 N. C. 218, 35 S. E. 426; Tenn. Code
(1932) sec. 8460; Hicks v. Sprankle (1923) 149 Tenn. 310, 257 S. W. 1044.
In the following states married women have power to convey title to
land but there is no decision sustaining a conveyance from one spouse to the
other. Conn. Gen. Stats. (1930) sec. 5154; Idaho Code Ann. (1932) tit. 31,
sec. 903; Va. Code (1936) sec. 5134.
109. Ga. Code (1933) tit. 53, sec. 504; Goss v. Brannon (1928) 167 Ga.
498, 146 S. W. 187 (W can convey to H only with court order) ; Minn. Stats.
(1927) sec. 8621; cf. Minn. Stats. (Mason's 1938 supp.) sec. 8229 (validates
certain prior conveyances between spouses); Vt. Public Laws (1933) sec.
3074.
110. Cases are collected in 1 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 651,
n. 25.
111. Cases are collected in 1 Tiffany, Real Property (2d ed. 1920) 650,
n. 23.
112. Crow v. Crow (1932) 348 Ill. 241, 180 N. E. 877.
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If a straw man is used as a conduit of title, neither his wife
nor his creditors receive any interest or right to any interest
in the land. 13 Because the straw man has title for only a brief
period of time, there is little danger that persons protected by
the recording act might secure prior rights to the property.
CONCLUSION
This discussion of certain problems arising from land trans-
actions involving straw men shows rather clearly that the mod-
ern problems are basically similar to those which arose from
conveyances to a feoffee to uses to hold title for the benefit of
the feoffor or grantor. The owners of property convey title to
straw men to conceal their ownership from the general public,
to defraud creditors, to prevent judgments from being a lien
on the land, to limit their liability, to make their interest more
alienable, or to evade taxation. These are the same reasons why
land was conveyed to the use of the grantor prior to 1535.
Because land is now the subject of commercial transactions
and is frequently conveyed from one person to another, would
it not be best for the courts to aid the owners to conceal their
ownership from the general public, but not from their creditors
or the state, and to make title more alienable, free from the liens
of judgments? Much of this could and should be done by the
courts themselves. They created most of the rules of convey-
ancing at a time when England was an agricultural nation and
when land was purchased principally for use as a residence or
as a long-term investment. Therefore, the courts are best qual-
ified to change these rules to meet modern needs. There is a
certain inconsistency in the cases defeating the purpose of stat-
utes by declaring them unconstitutional or by misconstruing
them and those decisions requesting legislative aid to change the
rules of law established by the courts.
113. 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees (1935) sec. 146.
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